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Introduction	
	
“There	is	no	greater	form	of	inequality	than	treating	unequal	things	as	equal.”	-	Aristotle,	Politics;	Book	III				Currently,	the	world	economy	in	its	majority	has	been	penetrated	by	the	capitalist	agenda	and	 ideology.	 Capitalist	 elements	 have	 permeated	 the	 political	 as	 well	 as	 the	 socio-economic	tissues	of	both	developed	and	developing	economies,	thus	hugely	influencing	today’s	world	as	we	know	it.	By	closely	inspecting	certain	characteristics	in	political	and	economic	 systems	 –	 such	 as	 the	 state	 intervention	 in	 the	 national	 economy,	 and	 the	politico-economic	 institutions	 that	 partake	 in	 it	 -	 certain	 forms	 of	 capitalism	 are	identified,	widely	known	as	‘models’	or	‘varieties’	in	academic	literature	(see:	Hall	and	Sockice,	2001).	One	of	these	forms	is	the	Japanese	capitalism,	a	model	universally	popular	amongst	economic	scholars	for	its	developmental	orientation.	In	the	aftermath	of	the	Second	World	War,	the	government	officials	of	the	most	advanced	 countries	 settled	 on	 the	 installation	 of	 a	 social	 contract	 characterized	 by	increased	 state	 intervention	 in	 economic	 affairs,	 as	well	 as	 the	moral	 obligation	 of	 a	satisfactory	level	of	employment	with	the	intention	to	provide	a	minimum	standard	of	living	for	all.	In	Japan’s	case,	Johnson	(1982)	coined	the	term	“developmental	state”	as	a	definition	of	 the	political	desire	 for	high	speed	growth	 in	 industrial	 and	 technological	development	 post-war.	 As	 a	 result	 of	 the	 state	 policies	 that	 followed,	 the	 Japanese	economy	 encountered	 remarkable	 growth	 between	 the	 decades	 of	 1950s	 and	 1980s,	thereby	 elevating	 the	 average	 income	 and	 acquiring	 the	 title	 of	 an	 ‘all-middle-class	society’	(Shirahase,	2014).		During	 this	 era,	 a	 new	 wave	 of	 political	 economic	 thought	 started	 to	 emerge	globally,	 widely	 associated	 with	 Ronald	 Reagan’s	 and	 Margaret	 Thatcher’s	administrations.	 The	 main	 features	 of	 their	 political	 ideologies	 included	 aspects	 of	neoliberal	 individualism,	 the	 commodification	 of	 all	 resources	 (including	 the	 labour	power)	and	the	undiluted	faith	in	an	unregulated	free	market	as	indicated	in	neoclassical	economic	theory	(Clarke,	2005;	Mudge,	2008).	Being	a	member	of	the	OECD	and	as	the	second	biggest	economy	in	the	world	during	the	mid-1980s,	Japan	undertook	a	series	of	
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measures	in	order	to	obtain	financial	deregulation.	However,	the	neoliberal	prescriptions	of	 minimal	 state	 intervention	 and	 flexible	 labour	 markets	 initially	 appeared	 to	 be	incompatible	with	the	regulations	of	the	Japanese	developmental	state.	Political	leaders	had	to	adopt	policies	that	would	put	Japan	in	a	transitory	phase	towards	a	market-based	economy.	 In	 this	 regard,	 Japan	 has	 implemented	 a	 peculiar	 institutional	 framework,	whereby	neoliberal	and	developmental	practices	coexist	in	its	economic	system	in	order	to	achieve	prosperity	and	growth	(Lechevalier,	2014).	The	implementation	of	deregulation	reforms	can	bear	benefits	as	well	as	ill	effects.		Liberal	scholars	insist	that	the	expansion	of	the	market	economy	and	the	absence	of	trade	barriers	would	produce	higher	 levels	of	 growth	 (Cargill	 and	Sakamoto,	2008).	 	At	 the	same	 time,	 however,	 market	 deregulation	 and	 economic	 policy	 liberalization	 also	contribute	 to	 the	 increase	 of	 inequality	within	 states,	 as	 these	 practices	 deviate	 from	government	intervention	and	regulation	(Hurrell	and	Woods,	1999)	and	further	enhance	the	 highest	 incomes	 (Jacobs	 and	 Myers,	 2014).	 The	 governments	 of	 industrially	developed	states	responded	in	diverse	ways	to	these	outcomes	(Watanabe,	2015),	and,	consequently,	major	institutions	such	as	the	Japanese	labour	market	has	been	severely	affected	by	these	policy	adjustments.		Japanese	workers	had	traditionally	enjoyed	high	levels	of	job	security,	primarily	due	to	the	life	time	employment	policy	that	had	been	prominent	throughout	the	period	before	the	bubble	burst.	The	stock	bubble	burst	in	1990	signaled	the	beginning	of	a	long	period	of	stagnation	that	is	still	pertinent	in	the	Japanese	economy.	Due	to	the	magnitude	of	the	recession,	the	public	and	private	employment	sectors	had	to	reduce	costs	through	wage	 cuts,	 increased	 working	 hours	 and	 opting	 for	 the	 recruitment	 of	 temporary	employees	over	permanent	ones	(Song,	2014).	The	government	–	and	in	particular	the	members	of	the	Liberal	Democratic	Party	(LDP)	-	adopted	a	series	of	neoliberal	reforms	to	 stimulate	 the	 demand	 economy	 (Lechevalier,	 2014).	 The	 effectiveness	 of	 these	measures	is	still	being	debated	by	policymakers	and	scholars	alike;	nevertheless,	labour	practices	and	working	conditions	have	been	significantly	altered	in	the	past	twenty	years.	This	occurrence	raises	the	following	question:		
To	what	extent	has	inequality	increased	in	the	Japanese	labour	market	due	to	the	neoliberal	
policies	that	were	implemented	during	the	last	two	decades?		
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The	main	purpose	of	this	dissertation	is	thus	to	link	the	Japanese	government’s	neoliberal	agenda	 with	 any	 consequences	 detected	 in	 the	 labour	 force.	 The	 largest	 part	 of	 the	relevant	scholarly	literature	primarily	 focuses	upon	the	political	and	economic	change	that	penetrates	 the	 Japanese	state	structure	and	 institutions	(Dore,	1999;	Vogel	2006;	Rosenbluth	 &	 Thies,	 2010),	 but	 only	 a	 few	 writers	 have	 analyzed	 the	 social	transformation	 and	 its	 connection	with	 neoliberal	 practices	 (Radice,	 2008;	 Shirahase,	2014).	This	research	is	important	as	it	will	outline	the	implications	of	neoliberalisation	from	the	perspective	of	ordinary	citizens,	using	aspects	such	as	unemployment	rates	and	wage	gaps,	to	prove	that	inequality	levels	have	risen	as	a	result	of	neoliberal	reforms.		This	paper	 is	structured	as	 follows.	The	 first	 chapter	discusses	 the	 concepts	of	neoliberalism	and	labour	inequality	in	Japan,	providing	a	brief	literature	review	on	the	matter.	 Notions	 such	 as	 labour	 segmentation	 and	 precarity,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 views	 of	scholars	regarding	their	effects	on	the	societal	and	economic	nexus	will	be	explained	in	the	 process.	 The	 second	 section	 explains	 in	 detail	 the	 research	 method	 and	 the	methodological	 tools	 used	 in	 this	 paper	 in	 order	 to	 investigate	 the	 Japanese	 labour	conditions.	The	third	part	presents	the	neoliberal	policies	of	four	Prime	Ministers	of	Japan	(Yasuhiro	Nakasone,	Ryutaro	Hashimoto,	Junichiro	Koizumi	and	Shinzo	Abe)	that	were	essential	 to	 the	 state’s	 enforcement	 of	 labour-market	 reforms,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 data	required	for	the	purpose	of	this	research.	In	the	fourth	section,	the	policies	are	further	discussed	to	determine	whether	the	levels	of	labour	inequality	have	also	increased	during	their	 prime-ministership.	 The	 last	 section	 offers	 some	 concluding	 remarks	 about	 the	results	of	the	analysis;	it	appears	that	the	deterioration	of	regulatory	measures	has	de	facto	 altered	 labour	 patterns,	 leading	 to	 the	 appearance	 of	 further	 disparities	 in	 the	Japanese	workforce.	
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Chapter	1:	Literature	Review		This	section	assesses	the	theoretical	 framework	surrounding	the	context	of	neoliberal	and	labour	market	reforms	experienced	in	Japan	over	the	latest	two	decades.	Prior	to	the	analysis,	it	is	imperative	to	present	the	political	principles	and	processes	that	highlight	the	diversification	of	employment	and	the	effects	of	deregulation	and	liberalization	on	working	 conditions.	 In	 particular,	 this	 chapter	 demonstrates	 the	 current	 scholarship	positions	 regarding	 the	 relationship	 between	 neoliberalization	 and	 inequality	 and	provide	a	brief	overview	about	the	current	condition	of	the	Japanese	labour	market.	In	doing	 so,	 scholarly	 views	 concerning	 the	 link	 between	 neoliberalism	 and	 labour	inequality	will	be	highlighted,	and	a	background	of	the	Japanese	case	will	be	provided.		Theoretical	Background		Neoliberalism	 is	 an	 ideological	 system	 consisting	 of	 institutionalized	 principles	 and	assorted	political,	economic	and	social	policies	that	influence	politico-economic	activities	(Campbell	and	Pedersen,	2001,	p.	5).	First	introduced	in	the	Mont	Pelerin	Society,	where	neoliberalism	was	developed	in	order	to	replace	the	Keynesian	model	(Clarke,	2005,	p.	7),	the	notions	of	minimalist	welfare	state,	flexible	labour	markets,	and	the	reduction	of	trade	barriers	are	now	regarded	as	the	theoretical	grounds	of	this	school	of	thought.	The	path	to	neoliberalism	may	differ	from	one	country	to	another	(Cambell	&	Petersen,	2001),	as	 it	 is	 a	 complex	 process	 of	 institutional	 change,	 a	 sui	 generis	 set	 composed	 of	intellectual,	bureaucratic	and	political	components	(Mudge,	2008,	p.	704).	Nevertheless,	it	is	generally	agreed	that	neoliberal	policies	constitute	of	government	decentralization,	deregulation,	 privatization	 and	 laissez-faire	 measures	 that	 allow	 for	 a	 free	 and	competitive	 international	 trade	 (Harvey,	 2005,	 p.	 2).	 This	 liberalization	 process	essentially	 increases	 income	 levels,	decreases	poverty	 rates	and	essentially	 leads	 to	a	prosperous	economic	well-being	for	all	(Hurrell	and	Woods,	1999,	p.	152).		 The	 neoliberal	 project	 thus	 proclaims	 that	 competition	 and	 free	 markets	 are	defining	features	that	lead	to	economic	equity	and	growth.	However,	numerous	scholars	have	 expressed	 reservations	 about	 the	 trade-off	 effects	 of	 this	 economic	 doctrine,	particularly	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 increasing	 inequality	 that	 it	 provokes.	 Ostry	 et	 al.	 (2016)	express	their	concerns	about	the	costs	of	the	neoliberal	agenda,	as	their	research	showed	that	neoliberal	policies	generate	distributional	effects	that	enhance	wealth	and	income	
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inequality.	According	to	Standing	(2014),	neoliberalism	views	competition	as	 the	core	element	 of	 global	 economic	 relations	 due	 to	 the	marginal	 productivity	 theory,	 which	maintains	that	the	production	process	benefits	the	most	productive	actors.	As	a	result,	higher	incomes	are	associated	with	a	greater	contribution	to	the	economy,	and	some	level	of	inequality	could	be	justified	in	terms	of	efficiency	(Tachibanaki,	2006a).	The	writings	of	Piketty	and	Goldhammer	(2014)	and	Jacobs	and	Myers	(2014)	illustrate	that	previous	neoliberal	 administrations	 in	 advanced	 states	 –	 such	 as	 in	 the	 United	 States	 and	 the	United	Kingdom	-	had	negative	impacts	upon	the	lower-	and	middle-class	households,	as	they	 led	to	unequal	 income	distribution	and	further	endorsed	disparities	 found	 in	the	labour	market.				 Recently,	 there	 has	 been	 growing	 discussion	 on	 the	 place	 of	 labour	market	 in	neoliberal	policy	projects	in	industrialized	countries.	Particularly	due	to	economic	crises	and	 increasing	 unemployment	 rates,	 governments	 are	 introducing	 pro-liberal	 labour	market	reforms	that	 increase	 flexibility	 in	employment	contracts	(Song,	2014,	p.	162).		Those	trends	suggest	that	neoliberal	practices,	such	as	deregulation	and	liberalization,	are	becoming	more	prominent	in	the	labour	sector.	
 Neoliberalism	and	Labour	Inequality		A. Inequality	in	the	Labour	Market	Equality	in	the	workplace	is	not	only	a	matter	of	diversity	and	social	justice,	but	also	a	precondition	 for	 achieving	 growth,	 competitiveness	 and	 social	 cohesion.	 However,	equitable	societies	are	not	necessarily	the	outcome	of	market	forces	(Berg,	2015,	p.	1);	they	 are	 formed	by	 the	 institutions	 –	 that	 is,	 the	 regulations,	 policies	 and	 norms	 –	of	several	sectors	of	a	state,	such	as	the	economic	system	and	the	labour	market.	In	order	to	reach	 and	 maintain	 satisfactory	 labour	 conditions,	 the	 state	 has	 to	 guarantee	 the	establishment	and	the	strengthening	of	institutions	that	regulate	the	workplace,	such	as	working	hour	 legislations,	minimum	wages	 and	 collective	 bargaining.	Nevertheless,	 it	appears	 that	 the	 expansion	 of	 the	 neoliberal	 capitalist	 model	 across	 the	 world	 has	increased	 the	 levels	of	 insecurity	 for	 large	 parts	 of	 the	 labour	market,	 putting	 at	 risk	individual	and	societal	well-being.		Neoliberal	prescriptions	prioritize	decentralization	and	 the	abolishment	of	 any	distortions	 that	 hinder	 competition	 and	 capital	 growth	 (Clarke,	 2005).	 Regulation,	taxation	 and	 public	 expenditures	 must	 be	 minimized;	 public	 corporations	 must	 be	
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privatized;	 collective	 bargaining	 unions	must	be	 restrained.	 In	 essence,	 neoliberalism	promotes	 the	 reduction	 of	 constraints	 and	 the	 weakening	 of	 regulatory	 control	 of	business	activities,	increasing	the	ability	of	employers	to	act	on	their	employees	as	they	please	(Baccano	and	Howell,	2011,	pp.	526-7).	This	leads	to	the	formulation	of	disparities	in	the	workforce,	which,	in	combination	with	the	politico-economic	framework	that	the	neoliberal	agenda	dictates,	could	potentially	produce	negative	outcomes	for	the	labour	market	and	for	society	as	a	whole	(Tsutomu,	2014).	One	 significant	 societal	 aspect	 that	 has	 deteriorated	 through	 the	 years	 due	 to	liberal	 intervention	 is	 the	standards	of	 income.	 Income	distribution	 is	essential	 for	 its	implications	 for	 stability	 and	 growth	 (Tachibanaki,	 2006a).	 According	 to	 Piketty	 and	Goldhammer	 (2014),	 however,	 the	 concentration	 of	 wealth	 amongst	 the	 top	 1%	 of	income	 distribution	 has	 intensified	 in	 advanced	 capitalist	 states.	 This	 signifies	 that	neoliberal	political	transformation	towards	deregulation	and	flexible	labour	has	severe	implications	in	wage	earners;	it	modifies	relations	of	social	hierarchy	and	power,	leading	groups	of	the	population	to	social	and	labour	market	exclusion	(Standing,	2014).	A	group	that	has	constantly	be	considered	to	remain	in	unlucrative	position	is,	according	to	Berg	(2015,	p.	57),	women	workers.	Women	are	more	 likely	 to	 receive	 lower	salaries	 than	their	 male	 counterparts,	 whilst	 they	 are	 often	 being	 occupied	 in	 atypical	 forms	 of	employment	with	fewer	benefits	and	substantially	lower	levels	of	job	security.		It	appears	that	 efforts	 to	 create	 a	 more	 equal	 society	 are	 limited	 under	 neoliberal	 principles;	inequality	is	justified	in	terms	of	utility	and	capital	growth	(Clarke,	2005).		B. The	adaptability	of	Labour	institutions	under	Neoliberalism	Labour	market	institutions	consist	of	a	vast	set	of	regulations	on	employment	protection,	social	 security,	 labour	mobility	 and	 income	 (Bass	 et	 al.,	 2010).	 The	 changing	market	conditions	called	for	successive	institutional	reforms	over	the	past	decades	in	the	name	of	 modernization	 and	 development.	 Those	 set	 of	 reforms,	 which	 are	 based	 on	 the	neoliberal	 principles	 of	 deregulation	 and	 minimum	 intervention,	 modify	 the	 current	trends	and	structures	in	employment	and	create	diverse	patterns	of	labour	flexibility	in	an	effort	to	boost	growth	and	efficiency.		Numerous	authors	have	recently	considered	the	concept	of	segmentation	of	the	labour	market	as	worthy	of	 attention	 (Lechevalier,	2014;	Song,	2014;	Standing,	2014;	Chiavacci	and	Hommerich,	2017).	A	market	is	regarded	as	segmented	when	it	is	divided	
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in	 two	 or	 several	 segments	 with	 minimal	 mobility	 between	 them.	 This	 leads	 to	 the	
dualism	of	the	labour	market,	whereby	the	types	of	occupation	are	distinguished	between	regular	(or	 formal)	and	non-regular	(informal)	employment	(Berg,	2015).	Parts	of	 the	labour	force	are	usually	immured	in	one	certain	type	of	employment,	limiting	their	career	prospects	and	job	security;	wages	and	work	conditions	are	also	quite	different	from	one	segment	 to	 another	 (Chiavacci	 and	 Hommerich,	 2017).	 This	 distinction	 diminishes	workers’	 statuses	 and	 further	 undervalues	 the	 quality	 of	 labour	 contracts.	 It	 is	 thus	inevitable	that	deregulation	policies	create	winners	and	losers,	in	which	case	non-regular	employees	experience	widening	gaps	 that	 require	effective	government	policies	 to	be	tamed	(Song,	2014).	Another	major	labour	transformation	is	the	appearance	of	a	new	mass	class	called	
precariat.	 As	 Standing	 (2014)	 explains,	 the	 precariat	 is	 characterized	 by	minimal	 job	security,	whereby	workers	 are	 faced	with	 zero	 career	 opportunities	 and	 the	 constant	threat	of	dismissal,	and	the	unemployed	are	unable	to	meet	the	employment	demands	of	capital.	Lorey	(2015)	insists	that	precarization	is	more	than	just	employment	insecurity;	it	is	a	process	of	normalization	of	the	poor	state	of	labour	conditions	under	the	neoliberal	order.	 It	 is	 a	 shortcoming	of	 global	 capitalism	 (Radice,	 2008;	Kalleberg,	 2009),	 as	 the	problems	 in	 the	 labour	market	 get	 exacerbated	 due	 to	 the	 escalation	 of	 competition	triggered	 by	 deregulation	 and	 minimal	 state	 intervention.	 Therefore,	 the	 neoliberal	labour	model,	characterized	by	flexible	labour	contracts,	poor	income	distribution	and	social	exclusion	for	certain	groups,	has	restricted	labour	rights	and	has	“[…]	habituated	most	workers	to	a	life	of	unstable	labour	and	unstable	living.”	(Standing,	2014,	p.	968)	Before	we	start	focusing	on	the	current	conditions	of	the	Japanese	labour	market,	it	is	necessary	 to	 highlight	 other	 factors	 that	 drive	 the	 new	 policies	 and	 influence	 labour	inequality	in	Japan.		Alternative	explanations	for	the	rise	of	labour	inequality		An	actor	which	plays	a	pivotal	role	in	shaping	socioeconomic	policies	that	can	potentially	increase	inequalities	is	the	Japanese	model	of	capitalism.	This	peculiar	set	of	domestic	institutions	is	characterized	by	state-led	economic	policies	that	highlight	the	influence	of	the	 state	and	bureaucracy	 in	economic	affairs	and	 in	 the	development	process,	giving	Japan	 the	 title	 of	 a	 developmental	 state	 (Johnson,	 1982).	 The	 neoliberal	 principle,	however,	 proclaims	 that	 the	 role	 of	 the	 state	 is	 limited	 to	 guarantee	 an	 institutional	
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structure	 and	 a	 legal	 framework	 appropriate	 enough	 for	 the	 right	 functioning	 of	 the	markets	 (Harvey,	 2005).	 In	 that	 sense,	 neoliberalism	 is	 a	 project	 that	 favours	 certain	policies	and	actors	and	diminishes	the	role	of	the	state,	a	phenomenon	that	contradicts	with	the	notion	of	the	developmental	state	(Tsukamoto,	2012,	p.	74).	Western	scholars	have	argued	that	structural	factors	are	to	blame	for	economic	downturns,	since	Japanese	financial	and	industrial	institutions	generate	regulations	to	protect	the	market	(Cowling	&	 Tomlinson,	 2002,	 p.	 374).	 It	 is	 thus	 assumed	 that	 the	 Japanese	 model	 hinders	liberalization	 and	 is	 not	 capable	 to	manage	 its	 consequences	 properly,	 leading	 to	 the	appearance	of	disparities	in	the	workplace	and	in	society	as	a	whole.			 Another	 explanation	 for	 the	 aggravation	 in	 labour	 conditions	 is	 the	 weak	macroeconomy.	Labour	market	 institutions	have	experienced	 several	 transformations	triggered	by	economic	crises	and	bumbles;	in	times	of	financial	and	economic	slumps,	the	private	 sector	 attempts	 to	 increase	 profitability	 by	 cutting	 out	 costs	 in	 employment	(Tachibanaki,	 2006b).	 Common	 practices	 include	 cutbacks	 on	 hiring	 new	 employees	(Hamaki	et	al.,	2010,	p.	21),	as	well	as	raising	the	number	of	non-regular	contracts	(Song,	2014).	An	economic	crisis	could	therefore	 lead	to	an	employment	crisis,	as	oftentimes	rigid	labour	 institutions	are	blamed	for	weak	economic	performance	(Berg,	2015,	p.8)	and	governments	seek	reforms	to	increase	flexibility,	create	jobs	and	sustain	competition.	Slow	economic	growth	and	low	demand	are	factors	that	enhance	inequality,	expand	the	number	 of	working	 poor	 and	 intensify	 labour	 vulnerabilities	 due	 to	 policy	 responses	aimed	to	resuscitate	economic	activity	(Bass	et	al.,	2010).	An	additional	explanation	related	to	the	rise	of	inequality	is	demographic	trends,	particularly	the	ageing	of	the	Japanese	population.	The	continually	ageing	society	has	put	acute	pressure	 to	 Japanese	policymakers,	 as	 the	elderly	are	expected	 to	account	 for	a	quarter	of	the	state’s	population	by	2020	(Jones	and	Fukawa,	2017,	p.	7).	This	translates	to	 increased	 public	 expenditures	 for	 pensions	 and	 higher	 wage	 costs	 thanks	 to	 the	seniority-based	 employment	 system.	 Combined	 with	 low	 fertility	 rates,	 these	 factors	contribute	 to	 the	 reduction	of	 the	 labour	 force	and	present	major	 concerns	about	 the	social	institutions	and	the	fiscal	sustainability	of	the	state.	Ohtake	(2008)	indicates	that	the	rapid	population	ageing	was	the	key	factor	for	the	widening	of	labour	inequality,	since	changes	in	the	population	and	in	the	family	structures	affect	income	distribution,	leading	to	higher	 income	inequality	among	the	elderly.	Although	the	same	author	would	 later	
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argue	that	income	disparities	have	spread	within	all	age	groups,	it	appears	that	the	ageing	society	is	still	regarded	as	a	major	cause	of	inequality	(Bass	et	al.,	2010,	p.	72).	The	aforementioned	conditions	could	expedite	the	state’s	adoption	of	pro-liberal	labour	 market	 policies;	 however,	 they	 are	 not	 sufficient	 factors	 to	 fully	 explain	 the	widening	of	labour	inequality	in	Japan.	It	is	therefore	mandatory	to	identify	the	unique	characteristics	of	 the	 Japanese	 labour	market	and	explore	 the	different	dimensions	of	their	responses	to	neoliberal	policy	reforms.		Neoliberalism	and	Labour	Inequality	in	Japan	In	order	to	understand	the	adaptability	of	the	Japanese	labour	market,	it	is	essential	to	investigate	 the	 characteristics	 of	 this	 particular	 employment	model.	 After	 the	 Second	World	War,	the	labour	system	adopted	the	principles	of	the	“three	treasures”	(sanshu	no	jingi):	 lifetime	 employment,	 enterprise	 unions	 (keiretsu)	 and	 seniority	wage	 systems	(Lechevalier,	2014;	Song,	2014).	This	set	of	 institutions	were	given	high	credit	 for	 the	economic	growth	that	ensued.	Traditionally,	 the	 Japanese	 corporal	 culture	 maintained	 strong	 employment	protection	 systems,	 whereby	 long-term	 labour	 commitments	 went	 side	 by	 side	 with	seniority-	 rather	 than	 performance-based	 salaries.	 These	 practices	 secured	 stable	employment	relations	as	workers	were	hired	with	the	implicit	understanding	that	their	employment	will	be	ensured	until	retirement	(Ono,	2010,	p.	5).		Nonetheless,	this	model	only	 applied	 to	 a	 certain	 population	 (mainly	 male	 regular	 workers)	 and	 has	 been	criticized	 for	 being	 inflexible	 and	 unadaptable	 to	 fiscal	 and	 labour	 challenges,	 as	 it	produced	employment	procedures	that	lacked	efficiency	and	agility	(Aoki,	2007;	Bass	et	al.,	 2010).	 Those	 functional	 inefficiencies	 called	 for	 labour	 reforms;	 however,	 the	intransigent	and	interdependent	nature	of	the	institutions	suggested	that	implementing	change	might	create	discordance	amongst	traditional	and	reformed	areas	(Lechevalier,	2014,	p.	31).	In	the	1980’s,	PM	Nakasone	came	into	power	unveiling	the	first	wave	of	neoliberal	policies	during	the	bubble	period	 (Cargil	 and	Sacamoto,	2008;	Hashimoto,	2014).	The	ruling	Liberal	Democratic	Party	aimed	to	reform	management	practices	in	the	public	and	private	sector	in	order	to	impose	built-in	flexibility	in	the	labour	market	and	reduce	the	role	of	the	state	in	financial	affairs,	primarily	as	a	response	to	pressure	from	the	US	and	large	 Japanese	 firms	 (Shibata,	 2008;	 Lechevalier,	 2014).	 Some	 scholars,	 such	 as	
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Hirashima	(2004)	and	Tsutomu	(2014)	assert	that	Japanese	policymakers	did	not	pursue	a	 coherent,	 full-fledged	 neoliberal	 programme,	 but	 rather	 pursued	 a	 customized	neoliberal	agenda	with	measures	adapted	to	the	coordinated	Japanese	economic	system.	Nonetheless,	 bureaucratic	 structures	 were	 recast	 and	 loyalty	 to	 the	 traditional	developmental	model	started	to	corrode,	especially	in	the	decade	following	the	bubble	burst.		The	 market	 crash	 and	 the	 forthcoming	 economic	 stagnation	 challenged	 the	traditional	 labour	 structures,	 damaging	 the	 image	 of	 egalitarian	 Japan.	 Income	 gaps	began	 to	 widen,	 employment	 security	 decreased	 and	 certain	 labour	 sectors	 were	transformed,	 resulting	 to	 the	 segmentation	 of	 the	 labour	market	 (Lechevalier,	 2014).	These	 changes	 led	 to	 the	 division	 (dualism)	 of	 labour	 into	 regular	 and	 non-regular	(flexible)	employment,	or,	as	defined	by	Song	(2014),	to	insiders	and	outsiders.		There	is	no	exact	legal	definition	of	regular	(or	lifetime)	employment	in	Japan.	The	common	 public	 conception	 suggests	 that	 regular	 employees	 are	 hired	 by	 their	perspective	company	with	contracts	of	indefinite	duration.	Employees	are	hired	in	entry-level	posts	with	the	prospect	of	committing	to	the	firm	until	their	mandatory	retirement	age	(Ono,	2010,	p.	4;	Song,	2010).	This	indicates	that	employers	usually	hire	workers	right	after	 their	 graduation	 and	 offer	 training	 and	 further	 incentives	 to	 ensure	 worker	discipline	 and	 keep	 them	 in	 the	 same	 company	 for	 a	 long	 duration	 (Shibata,	 2017;	Takahashi,	2018).	Hence,	lifetime	employees	are	privileged	enough	to	enjoy	protection	from	 likely	 dismissals	 and	 any	 other	 fluctuations	 in	 the	 labour	 market,	 since	 firms	generally	refrain	from	discharging	personnel	with	permanent	contracts	(Hamaki	et	al.,	2010;	Asao,	2011).	Notwithstanding	its	perks,	this	scheme	appears	to	be	gender	biased,	as	it	favors	men	and	excludes	women	who	are	considered	by	their	peers	to	be	less	likely	to	commit	long-term	in	a	firm	due	to	family	obligations	(Ono,	2010).	Despite	 the	 fact	 that	 there	 is	 no	 legal	 term	 for	 regular	 employment	 practices,	Japanese	 labour	 laws	 contain	 definitions	 for	 several	 types	 of	 atypical	 employment.	According	 to	Bass	et	 al.	 (2010)	 the	 largest	group	amongst	 them	 is	part-time	workers.	These	are	employees,	usually	young	adults	and	married	women,	who	are	directly	hired	by	their	firm	but	work	shorter	hours	per	week	and	receive	lower	salaries	and	welfare	benefits	than	ordinary	workers.	The	second	largest	category	is	temporary/contract	staff.	Contract	employees	are	hired	fulltime	for	short	(up	to	six	months)	or	long	term	(up	to	two	years)	periods,	with	fixed	salaries	and	oftentimes	with	the	possibility	to	renew	their	
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contracts	after	 their	 termination	(Asao,	2011;	Aoyagi	&	Ganelli,	2013).	A	third	 form	is	
dispatched	 employees,	 whereby	 contracts	 are	 entered	 between	 the	 employee	 and	 a	staffing	 agency	 rather	 than	 the	 enterprise	 (or	 client	 company)	 itself	 (Takashi,	 1994;	Sutton	 &	 Tanaka,	 2015).	 The	 agency	 dispatches	 workers	 to	 clients	 through	 service	agreements;	the	client	companies	then	instruct	the	dispatched	workers,	but	the	workers	maintain	 their	 employment	 relationship	 with	 the	 agency.	 This	 indirect	 type	 of	employment	can	be	fixed-term	or	open-ended,	full-	or	part-time,	providing	clients	with	greater	flexibility	when	it	comes	to	dismissals	(Asao,	2011,	p.	2).		The	 aforementioned	 types	 of	 employees	 do	 not	 enjoy	 the	 same	 benefits	 and	protection	as	their	permanent-employed	counterparts.	Irregular	workers	are	generally	paid	less	and	have	low	levels	of	job	security,	even	if	their	duties	and	tasks	are	identical	to	the	 ones	 performed	 by	 regular	 employees.	 Atypical	 employment	 in	 Japan	 is	 thus	 a	phenomenon	 that	 contains	 diverse,	 flexible	 employment	 arrangements	 and	 make	 it	easier	for	employers	to	control,	instruct	and	dismiss	employees	at	will	(Sutton	&	Tanaka,	2015).	While	numerous	studies	recognize	that	there	has	been	a	form	of	deregulation	and	segmentation	of	the	Japanese	labour	institutions	(Dore,	1999;	Vogel,	2006;	Lechevalier,	2014;	 North,	 2014)	 and	 pinpoint	 several	 factors	 that	 increase	 inequalities	 (see:	Alternative	 Explanations,	 p.	 10),	 there	 has	 been	 little	 consensus	 among	 scholars	 on	whether	and	to	what	degree	the	neoliberal	policies	adopted	in	the	last	twenty	years	have	contributed	to	the	aggravation	of	the	conditions	in	the	labour	market.  			
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Chapter	2:	Methodology		Period	Selection	In	order	to	examine	the	impact	of	neoliberal	economic	policies,	this	study	will	attempt	to	identify	 changes	 in	 labour	 inequality	 using	 a	 multi-disciplinary	 approach	 that	 will	combine	political,	social	and	economic	elements	and	draw	data	from	the	following	sets	of	time:		 I. Yasuhiro	Nakasone’s	period	 (November	1982	-	November	1987),	 taking	place	before	the	burst	of	the	stock	market	bubble,	II. Ryutaro	Hashimoto’s	period	(January	1996	-	July	1998),	after	the	bubble	burst	and	in	the	midst	of	the	“Lost	Decade”	and	the	Asian	Crisis,	III. Junichiro	 Koizumi’s	 period	 (April	 2001	 -	 July	 2006),	 before	 the	 2008	financial	crisis,	IV. Shinzo	Abe’s	second	and	third	Cabinet	(December	2012	-	November	2017),	after	the	financial	crisis.	The	time-spans	of	these	terms	of	office	are	selected	for	three	reasons.	First,	these	specific	Prime	Ministers	have,	according	to	the	academic	literature	(Cargil	and	Sacamoto,	2008;	Hashimoto,	2014;	Lechevalier,	2014;	Shibata,	2016),	attempted	to	administer	measures	that	fall	to	a	neoliberal	spectrum.	Second,	the	aforementioned	Prime	Ministers	originate	from	 the	 Liberal	 Democratic	 Party,	 a	 political	 party	 known	 for	 its	 neoconservative	orientation	 (Vogel,	2006;	Tsutomu,	2014).	 	Third,	 considering	 that	brief	 tenures	are	a	relatively	 common	 phenomenon	 in	 the	 Japanese	 political	 scene,	 these	 four	 Prime	Ministers	were	also	chosen	on	the	basis	that	their	time	in	the	Cabinet	lasted	for	at	least	24	months.		In	order	to	evaluate	properly	the	consequences	of	these	Prime	Ministers’	policies	and	draw	credible	conclusions,	the	analysis	will	also	include	data	taken	two	years	after	the	aforementioned	officials	stepped	down	from	power	(excluding	the	case	of	Shinzo	Abe,	who	 is	 still	 currently	 in	 office).	 Notably,	 while	 Yasuhiro	 Nakasone’s	 period	 does	 not	exactly	fall	in	the	specific	timeframe	of	the	research	question,	his	inclusion	is	viewed	as	mandatory	since	his	policies	constitute	the	turning	point	for	the	Japanese	economic	and	political	model	and	“formed	the	basis	for	a	vast	programme	of	structural	reforms	in	the	1990s.”	(Lechevalier,	2014,	p.	31)	
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Research	Methods	By	collecting	and	examining	empirical	evidence	one	can	assess	whether	neoliberalism	has	affected	the	Japanese	working	force.	The	research	design	will	use	process	tracing	in	order	to	analyze	the	evidence	and	conclude	whether	inequality	has	risen	in	the	society	of	Japan	during	neoliberal	administration.	Process	tracing	allows	for	 the	 identification	of	the	 causal	 mechanisms	 that	 would	 link	 an	 independent	 variable	 with	 a	 dependent	variable	 (George	 and	 Bennett,	 2005,	 p.	 206).	 For	 the	 purpose	 of	 this	 analysis,	neoliberalization	 will	 be	 regarded	 as	 the	 independent	 variable,	 whilst	 aspects	 of	inequality	 will	 be	 viewed	 as	 the	 dependent	 variable.	 By	 paying	 close	 attention	 to	sequences	 of	 the	 independent,	 dependent	 and	 any	 other	 intervening	 variables,	 an	analysis	 of	 the	 causal	 inferences	will	 be	 formulated,	 so	 as	 to	 diagnose	whether	 these	neoliberal	political	acts	produce	labour	disparities	over	time.	It	is	argued	that	process	tracing	acts	as	the	ideal	methodological	tool	for	economic,	political	and	social	sciences	in	order	to	investigate	the	context	and	the	ways	in	which	the	connection	between	the	above	variables	manifests	itself	(Waldner,	2012).	Process	tracing	can	 trace	 and	 evaluate	 causal	 relationships	 between	 conditions	 and	 outcomes	which	might	initially	be	unobservable,	as	well	as	identify	sequences	of	events	and	behaviors	that	contribute	 to	 this	 process	 (Falleti,	 2006).	 For	 this	 particular	 case,	 this	 method	 can	illustrate	 whether	 and	 how	 neoliberal	 principles	 have	 affected	 the	 conditions	 in	 the	Japanese	 labour	 force	 by	 revealing	 valid	 causal	 mechanisms	 that	 would	 explain	 any	changes	observed	in	the	labour	market.	 The	 type	 of	 sources	 to	 be	 used	 are	 predominately	 secondary;	 the	 studying	 of	scholarly	 literature,	 academic	 journals	 and	 articles	 is	 imperative.	 Policy	 reports	 by	government	and	quasi-governmental	research	organizations	(such	as	The	Japan	Institute	for	 Labour	 Policy	 and	 Training	 and	The	 Japanese	 Economic	 Association)	will	 also	 be	referred	to	in	the	process.	The	data	necessary	can	be	collected	from	the	online	archives	of	the	International	Labour	Organization,	the	database	of	the	Organization	for	Economic	Co-operation	 and	 Development	 (OECD)	 as	well	 as	 the	 official	 sites	 of	 the	Ministry	 of	Health,	Labour	and	Welfare,	 the	Ministry	of	 Internal	Affairs	and	Communications,	 the	Ministry	of	Economy,	Trade	and	Industries	and	the	Statistics	Bureau	of	Japan.	This	data	triangulation	 (the	 use	 of	 both	 written,	 academic	 works	 and	 statistical	 data)	 would	increase	the	validity	and	the	credibility	of	the	research.		
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Indicators	and	Limitations	of	Study	The	research	would	be	incomplete	without	referencing	major	reforms	in	labour	policy	and	other	key	areas	linked	to	employment	conditions.	Each	government	administration	will	be	discussed	separately	with	reference	to	its	policies,	in	order	to	assess	their	effects	on	the	Japanese	workers.	In	doing	so,	the	impacts	of	the	state	practices	in	the	labour	force	and	 therefore	 in	 the	 Japanese	 society	 will	 be	 highlighted.	 This	 paper	 will	 employ	 a	qualitative	method	to	analyze	the	neoliberalization	process	in	Japan,	therefore	it	will	not	overly	rely	on	quantitative	indexes.	However,	certain	number-centric	indicators	related	to	labour	inequality	will	be	used	in	the	process,	in	order	to	increase	the	level	of	focus	of	the	 study	 and	 understand	 some	 essential	 aspects	 of	 labour	 inequality	 in	 a	 more	comprehensive	and	detailed	manner.	- Wage	growth	rates:	According	to	Tachibanaki	(2006b,	p.	2),	income	statistics	are	perceived	as	a	valid	 indicator	 to	measure	 labour	 inequalities,	 as	 they	are	more	reliable	 than	 the	 ones	 concerning	 consumption,	 wealth	 and	 taxes.	 The	 wage-setting	behaviors	are	influenced	by	liberalization	(Bass	et	al.,	2010;	Hamaki	et	al.,	2010),	 and,	 consequently,	 workers	 may	 face	 disparities	 due	 to	 poor	 income	distribution.	Since	the	Yearly	Family	Income	and	Expenditure	survey	conducted	by	the	Ministry	of	Internal	Affairs	and	Communications	contains	data	only	from	1999	 onwards,	 the	 required	 data	 for	wage	 growth	 rates	 can	 be	 drawn	 by	 the	yearly	Basic	Survey	on	Wage	Structure	from	the	Ministry	of	Health,	Labour	and	Welfare.	- Unemployment	rates:	The	rate	of	unemployment	is	an	important	indicator	with	severe	 economic	 implications	 that	 contribute	 to	 a	 great	 extent	 to	 the	 overall	increase	 of	 labour	 inequality	 (Takahashi,	 2018).	 Furthermore,	 government	policies	 need	 to	 be	 examined	 for	 their	 influence	 in	 shaping	 unemployment	 in	specific	groups	of	the	Japanese	population,	such	as	women	and	the	elderly.	Data	for	this	indicator	can	be	found	in	the	Annual	Report	on	the	Labour	Force	Survey,	conducted	by	the	Statistics	Bureau	of	Japan.	 - Non-Permanent	Employment	rates:	The	declining	long-term	employment	and	the	widening	 income	gap	between	 regular	and	 irregular	employees	 lead	 to	 the	increase	 the	 levels	 of	 inequality	 in	 the	 labour	 force,	 affecting	 mostly	 female	workers,	 young	 graduates	 and	 the	 elderly	 population	 (Aoyagi	&	Ganelli,	 2013;	Watanabe,	 2017).	 To	 identify	 changes	 in	 the	 numbers	 of	 non-permanent	
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employees,	data	will	be	collected	 from	the	Employment	Status	Survey,	which	 is	conducted	 every	 five	 years	 by	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Internal	 Affairs	 and	Communications,	 as	 well	 as	 from	 the	 OECD’s	 annual	 report	 on	 jobs	 and	employment	 in	 OECD	 countries	 (Employment	 Outlook).	 Since	 both	 the	 OECD	Employment	Outlook	and	 the	Employment	Status	Survey	 review	 labour	 trends	from	 the	 period	 of	 1996-1997	 onwards,	 this	 indicator	 cannot	 be	 included	 in	Nakasone’s	period.		Whilst	the	above	indicators	represent	certain	aspects	of	labour	inequality,	it	would	be	a	grave	 mistake	 to	 solely	 rely	 on	 numerical	 data	 for	 this	 particular	 study.	 Positivist	approaches,	such	as	 the	Lorenz	curve	and	the	Gini	coefficient,	are	 insufficient	 tools	 to	properly	measure	aspects	related	to	social	 inequalities,	since	 further	disparities	might	not	be	reflected	in	the	figures	(Held	and	Kaya,	2007).	Hence,	in	order	to	investigate	the	ramifications	of	neoliberal	policies	and	identify	any	causal	capacities	in	the	labour	sector	that	can	be	attributed	to	them,	emphasis	will	be	given	mostly	to	empirical	evidence	from	academic	resources	and	government	policies	associated	with	the	topic.	Due	 to	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 present	 thesis	 being	 one	 that	 is	 relying	 mostly	 on	secondary	 research	 and	 the	 collection	 of	 secondary	 data,	 there	 should	 not	 exist	 any	ethical	 concerns	 or	 bias.	 However,	 a	 few	 expected	 challenges	 can	 arise	 in	 terms	 of	transparency.	The	data	used	is	widely	available	online,	but	the	measuring	methods	used	by	the	different	institutions	may	vary.	Such	differences	are	to	be	expected,	and	any	data	inconsistencies	between	the	sources	will	be	stated	clearly.	Furthermore,	there	is	always	the	possibility	that	the	data	might	get	lost	overnight	from	its	original	sources,	therefore	all	the	data	used	is	appended	accordingly	at	the	end	of	this	paper.		
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Chapter	3:	Analysis	/	Data	Presentation		
Cabinet	 Main	Policies	 Context	
Nakasone		
(1982-1987)	 Minkatsu	Act	(1986)	 Stimulation	of	the	private	sector	through	investments,	including	the	sale	of	nationally	and	publicly	owned	land	and	services	
Labour	Standards	Act	(1986-7)		 Contains	the	Discretionary	Work	Hours	Rule	and	the	Equal	Employment	Opportunity	Law	
Maekawa	Commission	
Reports	(1986-7)	 Recommendations	for	measures	that	boost	economic	growth	and	liberalize	the	financial	and	labour	markets	
Worker	Dispatching	Law	(1986)	 Legalization	of	worker	dispatching	system	for	specific	occupational	sectors	(positive	list)	with	increased	protection	for	regular	workers	
Hashimoto		
(1996-1998)	
Big	Bang	(1996)	 Austerity	measures	and	deregulation	policies	in	financial	and	labour	markets	
Employment	Security	Law	
Ordinance	(1997-9)*	 Legalization	of	private	employment	services,	adjustments	to	working	hours	and	wage	system	
Amendment	to	Worker	
Dispatching	Law	(1999)*	 Legalization	of	worker	dispatching	system	for	all	occupational	sectors	except	for	the	ones	mentioned	in	the	negative	list	
Koizumi	
	(2001-2006)	
“Structural	Reform	without	
Sanctuaries”	(2001)	 Regulatory	reforms	for	financial	revival,	including	privatizations	and	fiscal	consolidation	
Labour	Standards	Act	
Revision	(2003)	 Revisions	concerning	fixed-term	contracts,	dismissals,	and	the	Discretionary	Work	Hours	Rule	
	 Amendment	to	Worker	
Dispatching	Law	(2003)	 Allowed	the	employment	of	dispatch	workers	in	the	manufacturing	sector	
Abe		
(2012-2017)	
Abenomics	(2012)	 Three-pronged	policy	with	monetary,	fiscal	and	other	structural	adjustments	
Labour	Standards	Act	
Revision	(2013)	 Expansion	of	the	discretionary	work	scheme	and	introduction	of	‘equal	work	–	equal	pay’	principle	
	 Amendment	to	Worker	
Dispatching	Law	(2015)	 Liberalization	of	agency	work,	replacement	of	position-basis	with	person-basis	employment	term	
 
 
 
 
 *Passed	by	the	Diet	in	1999,	yet	both	Laws	were	planned	during	Hashimoto’s	tenure.	
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1. Yasuhiro	Nakasone	(November	1982	to	November	1987)	The	 turning	 point	 for	 the	 transformation	 of	 the	 Japanese	 state	 is	 considered	 to	 be	Yasuhiro	Nakasone’s	premiership	(1982-1987).	Nakasone	pushed	a	series	of	structural	reforms	in	an	attempt	to	adopt	a	programme	similar	to	the	ones	that	Ronald	Reagan	and	Margaret	 Thatcher	 implemented	 in	 the	 States	 and	 the	 UK	 respectively	 (Tachibanaki,	2006a,	p.	119).	These	reforms	were	pressured	by	both	external	(by	the	United	States)	and	 internal	 (by	 domestic	 banks	 and	 firms)	 entities,	 and	were	 also	 influenced	 by	 the	ideological	shift	that	the	leading	Liberal	Democratic	Party	was	experiencing	at	that	time	(Lechevalier,	 2014,	 p.	 32).	 Nakasone	 tried	 to	 minimize	 the	 power	 of	 the	 state	 by	introducing	 a	 series	 of	 privatizations	 and	 by	 endorsing	 deregulation	 policies.	 The	financial	deregulation	and	the	supply-side	reforms	that	accompanied	it	challenged	the	levels	of	equality	and	well-being	in	the	Japanese	society	(Tachibanaki,	2006a).			Economic	policies	The	Cabinet	of	Nakasone	promoted	liberal	measures	and	pledged	to	seek	administrative	and	 fiscal	 reforms	 in	 an	 attempt	 to	 strengthen	 domestic	 and	 international	 economic	affairs.	In	order	to	achieve	this	goal,	the	administration	adopted	a	programme	of	internal	and	 external	 deregulation	 that	 would	 allow	 for	 greater	 flexibility	 and	 dispose	 of	restrictions	in	the	financial	and	labour	institutions	of	the	coordinated	Japanese	economy	(Lechevalier,	2014,	p.	33).	One	of	these	measures	was	the	minkatsu	policy,	a	framework	which	 encouraged	market-led,	 private	 investments	 in	 public	projects	 to	 stimulate	 the	stagnated	economy.	The	minkatsu	policies	undertaken	by	Nakasone	were	administrative	deregulation	reforms	 that	 were	 also	 applied	 to	 land-use	 and	 urban	 planning.	 The	 greatest	accomplishment	 of	 the	 reforms,	 according	 to	 Kuniko	 Shibata	 (2008,	 p.	 99),	 was	 the	privatization	of	four	public	entities:	The	Japan	Tobacco	and	Salt	Public	Corporation,	the	Nippon	 Telegraph	 and	 Telephone	 corporation,	 the	 Japan	 National	 Railway	 and	 Japan	Airways	(Shibata,	2008;	Lechevalier,	2014,	p.	36).	This	series	of	privatizations	succeeded	in	decreasing	state	expenditures,	but,	on	the	other	hand,	it	also	increased	the	number	of	dismissals	 in	 these	 firms,	which,	 in	combination	with	the	suppression	of	 the	power	of	labour	unions,	created	further	instabilities	in	the	labour	institutions.	As	can	be	seen	from	the	 collocated	 graph	 (Figure	 1),	 during	 Nakasone’s	 tenure	 unemployment	 rates	were	generally	kept	below	the	2,7%	mark,	except	 for	 the	period	whereby	the	privatizations		
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took	 effect	 (late	 1985	 to	 1987),	 since	 thousands	 of	 workers	 were	 dismissed	 in	 this	process	 (Takanashi,	 1992).	 Minkatsu	 was	 thus	 regarded	 as	 a	 strategy	 similar	 to	 the	deregulation	and	public-private	partnerships	policies	advocated	by	neoliberal	thinkers,	shifting	the	developmental	state	towards	a	liberal	path	(Shibata	2008,	p.	99).		Labour	Policies	A	notable	policy	in	the	field	of	labour	was	the	enactment	of	the	Worker	Dispatching	Law,	a	 placement	 act	 that	 legalized	 a	 working	 dispatching	 service	 which	 allowed	 firms	 in	certain	occupational	categories	to	legally	dispatch	employees	from	agencies	(ILO,	2018).	Until	 then,	 dispatch	 agencies	 were	 prohibited	 by	 the	 original	 Labour	 Standards	 Law	(1947),	 yet	 several	 businesses	 that	 offered	 contract	 work	 started	 to	 make	 their	appearance	(Takashi,	1997,	p.	12).	The	Law	was	an	attempt	to	provide	legal	protection	to	temporary	workers	and	balance	out	the	emerging	dispatching	market	with	the	regular,	life-time	 employees	 (Takanashi,	 1992,	 p.	 10).	 However,	 it	 also	 included	 employment	protections	to	guarantee	that	the	liberalization	of	the	temporary	sector	would	not	lead	to	the	 erosion	 of	 regular	 employment	 (Song,	 2014).	 Thus,	 the	 government	 confined	dispatchable	work	to	a	“positive	list”	of	only	16	professional	sectors	(which	would	later	expand	 to	 26)	 that	 required	 specialized	 skills	 and	 experience	 or	 special	management	(Takashi,	1999,	p.	18).	As	a	result,	the	number	of	temporary	employees	increased	in	the	following	years,	particularly	between	women	and	elderly	workers	(Takashi	,1994).	As	part	of	the	deregulation	programmes,	the	Diet	enacted	the	Discretionary	Work	Hours	Rule	 in	1987.	 In	order	 to	 flexibilize	 the	 rules	regarding	working	 time,	 the	Rule	
Figure 1: Unemployment rates for people aged 15-65 (%). Source:  Statistics Bureau of Japan (2017).	
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introduced	a	relaxation	of	regulations	on	the	hours-averaging	scheme	(Takashi,	1999,	p.	14)	and	reduced	the	maximum	working	hours	from	48	to	40	per	week	(Yamakawa,	1998).	In	doing	so,	labour	institutions	began	shifting	towards	a	performance-based	rather	than	a	quantity-based	(amount	of	working	time)	management	practices	(Song,	2014).		Towards	 the	 end	 of	 his	 tenure,	 Nakasone	 proposed	 a	 series	 of	 structural	 and	administration	measures	in	order	to	increase	demand	and	reduce	the	size	of	the	public	sector	 (Shibata,	 2008).	 These	 measures	 were	 incorporated	 in	 the	 Maekawa	 reports	(1986-7),	which	contained	specific	guidelines	to	reassess	the	economic	system,	achieve	fiscal	 growth	 and	 meet	 liberalization	 goals	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 free	 market	 principles	(Hirashima,	 2004;	 ILO,	 2018).	 The	 reports	 instructed	 reforms	 inspired	 by	 policies	promoted	 by	 the	 US	 neoliberal	 agenda	 in	 the	 areas	 of	 finance,	 trade	 and	 the	 labour	market,	 and	 constituted	 a	 response	 to	 the	 turbulent	 currency	 fluctuation	 that	 were	persistent	at	that	period	of	time	(Takanashi,	1992,	p.	7;	Lechevalier,	2014,	p.	31-2).	Whilst	these	 strategies	aimed	 to	boost	domestic	demand	by	providing	 incentives	 to	 increase	private	and	public	investments,	they	did	not	particularly	have	positive	effects	on	worker’s	salaries;	as	demonstrated	in	Figure	2	below,	total	wage	earnings	increased	by	2%	and	by	just	0,1%	in	1987-8,	 followed	by	a	massive	 increase	of	5,7%	in	1989	due	to	the	 fiscal	bubble.	 The	 subsequent	 market	 crash	 indicated	 that	 the	 Maekawa	 reports	 failed	 to	safeguard	 the	 economy,	 leading	 to	 the	 skyrocketing	 of	 land	 prices,	 two	 decades	 of	recession,	and	causing	further	unease	to	the	Japanese	society.		
 
Figure 1: Total wage earnings growth (%). Source: Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (2017).	
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As	the	Japanese	capitalism	model	began	to	be	pushed	to	its	limits,	the	policies	of	Nakasone	foreshadowed	the	forthcoming	neoliberal	reforms	of	Hashimoto	and	Koizumi.	Even	though	Nakasone’s	measures	were	a	result	of	Western	demands	(Lechevalier,	2014;	Song,	2014),	he	carried	out	the	privatizations	of	four	major	public	companies	as	well	as	other	 administrative	 reforms	 in	 order	 to	 deregulate	 and	 liberalize	 the	 coordinated	economic	system.	For	 the	 first	 time	 in	post-war	history,	 Japanese	bureaucracy	 lost	 its	dominant	 role	 in	 economic	 affairs,	 as	 the	 deregulation	 and	 decentralization	 policies	administered	at	that	time	meant	that	bureaucrats	no	longer	guided	the	policy	formulation	process.	 The	 labour	 market	 was	 also	 affected	 by	 these	 reforms;	 the	 dispatching	employment	 legislation	 signaled	 a	 new	 era	 of	 labour	 policies	 whereby	 expansion	 of	atypical	workers	and	lack	of	employment	security	started	to	become	a	norm	(Takanashi,	1992;	 Takashi,	 1994).	 It	 is	 evident	 that	 Nakasone’s	 mandate	 advocated	“internationalization	for	Japan,	general	reorientation	towards	a	consumer	economy	[…]	and	greater	flexibility,”	(Lechevalier,	2014,	p.	38)	paving	the	way	to	further	deregulation	programmes	by	the	subsequent	governments.	
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2. Ryutaro	Hashimoto	(January	1996	to	July	1998)	The	period	of	Hashimoto’s	prime	ministership	is	typically	regarded	as	the	starting	point	of	 full-fledged	 neoliberalism	 in	 Japan,	 mainly	 due	 to	 the	 austerity	 measures	 he	implemented	during	the	Asian	Crisis	(Lechevalier,	2014;	Tsutomu,	2014).	The	collapse	of	the	bubble	signaled	the	beginning	of	a	long	period	of	stagnation,	whereby	growth	rates	stalled,	unemployment	rates	reached	historical	levels	and	temporary	workers	increased	(Inagami,	 2003;	 Chiavacci	 &	 Hommerich,	 2017).	 In	 order	 to	 revitalize	 the	 sluggish	economy,	 the	 Cabinet	 issued	 a	 deregulation	 promotion	 programme	 that	 contained	structural	reforms	in	broad	areas	of	economic	interest,	including	labour	and	employment	relations.	 In	 pursuance	 of	 adapting	 traditional	 regulations	 to	 the	 new	 employment	standards,	Hashimoto’s	legacy	in	labour	relations	consists	of	the	Employment	Security	Law	Ordinance	(1997)	and	its	revision	(1999),	as	well	as	a	revision	to	Nakasone’s	Worker	Dispatching	 Law	 (1999).	 Whilst	 the	 two	 revisions	 were	 passed	 by	 the	 Diet	 after	Hashimoto	stepped	down	from	power,	they	should	be	analyzed	on	the	grounds	that	LDP	politician	 Obuchi	 Keijo	 (Hashimoto’s	 successor)	 inherited	 and	 passed	 these	 labour	market	proposals	 that	had	been	planned	and	prepared	by	Hashimoto’s	Cabinet	(Song,	2014).		Economic	Policies	The	 government	 of	 Japan	 had	 to	 seek	 out	 new	 remedies	 for	 the	 weak	 economic	performance	that	had	been	lingering	after	the	bursting	of	the	bubble.	In	an	attempt	to	liberalize	 the	 Japanese	 overprotective	 market,	 Hashimoto	 unveiled	 a	 deregulation	programme	 concerning	 six	 broad	 areas:	 the	 financial	 industry,	 the	 bureaucracy,	 the	economic	 system,	 the	 national	 budget,	 social	 welfare	 and	 education	 (Cabinet	 Office,	1997).	His	policy	plan	was	dubbed	the	Big	Bang,	named	after	a	similar	agenda	effected	by	Margaret	 Thatcher	 in	 1986	 that	 promoted	 deregulation	measures	 in	 the	UK	 financial	market.			 The	 Cabinet	 promoted	 the	 complete	 deregulation	 of	 the	 financial	 sector	 and	implemented	a	vast	series	of	structural	and	financial	reforms	through	fiscal	consolidation	and	administration	adjustments	(Hirashima,	2004,	p.	43).	In	doing	so,	the	government	restrained	expenditures	in	most	sectors,	remodeled	the	tax	system,	social	security	and	pension	system	and,	most	importantly,	reduced	the	role	of	the	state	in	economic	affairs.	The	Japanese	market	should	become	“free,	fair	and	global,”	(Cabinet	Office,	1997)	and	not	
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get	hampered	or	halted	by	complicated	bureaucratic	structures.	As	such,	the	government	focused	 to	 reshuffle	 the	 coordinated	 market	 by	 administering	 further	 deregulation	policies	 in	 firm	management	 and	 in	 labour	 institutions	 (Lechevalier,	 2014,	 p.	 40).	 In	effect,	 Hashimoto’s	 Cabinet	 was	 essentially	 following	 the	 principles	 of	 Nakasone	(Lechevalier,	 2014,	 p.	 40)	 and	 brought	 forward	 further	 neoliberal	 instructions	 in	 all	institutions	in	an	attempt	to	get	the	Japanese	economic	system	to	the	right	direction.		Labour	Policies	In	order	to	flexibilize	the	labour	market	and	keep	unemployment	at	a	low	level	(which	was	already	rapidly	growing	at	that	time	–	see	Figure	3	above),	the	Cabinet	revised	the	
Employment	 Security	 Law	 (1947).	 As	 Takashi	 (1999,	 p.	 8-9)	 indicates,	 the	 old	 ESL	prohibited	 private	 employment	 placement	 agencies	 with	 the	 exception	 of	 limited	occupational	sectors.	The	new	Ordinance	places	private	services	on	the	same	level	with	public	 employment	 offices	 which,	 until	 then,	 were	 monopolized	 by	 the	 state.	Furthermore,	 to	 adjust	 employment	 management	 and	 compete	 with	 other	 Asian	industries	 that	were	 flourishing	 at	 that	 time,	 the	 government	 shifted	 towards	 flexible	working	 hours	 and	 a	 performance-based	 wage	 system	 (Song,	 2014).	 Although	 these	measures	were	 to	 reduce	obstacles	 in	occupational	 activities,	 they	 caused	deleterious	effects	on	workers’	 salaries	 (Shibata,	2016,	p.	498);	 as	 can	be	 seen	 from	Figure	4,	 the	stability	of	wage	earnings	were	undermined	during	Hashimoto’s	tenure,	peaking	in	1997	at	6,3%	in	1997	and	plummeting	at	-3,2%	in	1999,	when	the	ESL	Ordinance	eventually	took	effect.		
Figure 3: Unemployment rates for people aged 15-65 (%). Source: Statistics Bureau of Japan (2017).	
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Figure 4: Total wage earnings growth (%). Source: Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (2017).	The	Ministry	of	Health,	Labour	and	Welfare	announced	the	revision	of	the	Worker	
Dispatching	Law	to	eliminate	further	restrictions	in	the	labour	market.	To	reiterate,	the	original	WDL	(1986)	 legalized	temporary	agency	employment	 for	a	 limited	number	of	occupations	 (the	 ones	 included	 in	 the	 “positive	 list”);	 however,	 business	 circles	deprecated	on	this	enactment,	as	they	viewed	that	the	restriction	of	allowable	work	to	a	short	list	of	occupations	was	too	narrow	and	did	not	reflect	the	current	labour	conditions	de	 facto	(Takashi,	1999,	p.	12).	 In	addition,	other	 international	and	domestic	 factors	 -	such	as	 the	adoption	of	 ILO	Convention	regarding	Private	Employment	Agencies	(ILO,	2018)	 and	 the	 increasing	 unemployment	 rates	 observed	 after	 the	 bubble	 crash	 (see	Figure	3),	highlighted	the	necessity	 for	 the	development	of	a	 tentative	plan	to	provide	new	 forms	 of	 safety	 in	 the	 labour	 market.	 Hence,	 the	 Ministry	 undertook	 further	liberalization	 of	 the	 WDL	 by	 introducing	 a	 “negative	 list”	 system	 whereby	 working	dispatching	was	generally	liberalized	except	for	certain	sectors	mentioned	in	the	negative	list,	such	as	construction,	port	transportation	and	(for	the	time	being)	manufacture	(Song,	2014).		The	introduction	of	the	negative	list	system	abolished	general	prohibitions	on	the	listed	 occupations	 and,	 as	 a	 result,	 is	 considered	 to	 be	 the	most	 significant	 aspect	 of	Hashimoto’s	labour	policies	at	a	time	when	deregulation	drives	were	prominent	due	to	competition	under	globalization	(Watanabe,	2015).	As	indicated	by	the	Japanese	Institute	of	Labour	(Takashi,	1999),	this	drastic	change	in	regulations	would	ameliorate	worker’s	conditions	in	declining	industries,	since	they	would	provide	an	active	labour	market	to	the	unemployed	and	create	further	employment	opportunities	to	diversify	the	workforce.			
1996, 0.1
1997, 6.3
1998, -0.8
1999, -3.2
2000, -2.4
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
Kyriaki	Galaiou	 	 s1773186	
27 
 
Thus,	the	new	WDL	simplified	administrative	procedures	and	increased	labour	mobility	in	 the	 sectors	 not	 included	 in	 the	 negative	 list,	 expanding	 the	 use	 of	 non-regular	employment	 from	22,3%	of	 the	 Japanese	workforce	 to	25,6%	 in	 just	 three	years	 (see	Figure	5).	The	implementation	of	the	legislation	benefited	employers	by	securing	labour	power	in	a	tightening	market,	but	increased	job	insecurity	amongst	non-regular	workers;	since	 regulations	 contained	 mostly	 measures	 to	 protect	 employees	 with	 permanent	contracts,	there	was	a	widespread	concern	on	whether	non-regular,	temporary	workers	will	eventually	turn	out	to	be	cheap	labour	with	minimal	employment	security	(Takashi,	1997,	p.	15).	Indeed,	later	labour	scholars,	such	as	Song	(2010)	and	Lechevalier	(2014)	insist	that	non-regular	workers	would	eventually	bear	the	cost	of	economic	and	labour	adjustments.	To	synopsize,	Japan’s	secondary	labour	market	experienced	remarkable	growth	in	mid	 1990’s.	 The	 Cabinet	 brought	 forward	 a	 package	 of	 neoliberal	 reforms	 through	fiscal	consolidation	in	economic	affairs	and	deregulation	practices	in	labour	legislation.	It	is	argued	that	Hashimoto’s	structural	reforms	did	not	achieve	his	initial	financial	goals	(Hirashima,	2004,	p.	45);	nonetheless,	his	policies	played	a	crucial	role	in	shaping	labour	relations,	pushing	forward	a	new	phase	of	liberalization	and	deregulation	in	the	form	of	atypical	employment	expansion	and	flexible	management	(Lechevalier,	2014).			
  
 	
Figure 5: Total number of regular and non-regular employees, plus total ratio of irregular workers compared to regular 
employees. Source: Ministry of Interior Affairs and Communication (2017), OECD (2018).	
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3. Junichiro	Koizumi	(April	2001	to	September	2006)	Junichiro	Koizumi	became	Prime	Minister	right	after	the	lost	decade,	with	promises	to	precipitate	the	stalling	economy	into	recovery.	Since	previous	economic	tools	had	proven	to	 be	 futile,	 he	 intended	 to	 use	 a	 counter-cyclical	 policy,	 introducing	market-oriented	reforms	 under	 the	 prism	 of	 neoliberalism	 (Song,	 2014).	 Despite	 the	 bureaucratic	obstacles	and	the	political	resistance	he	had	to	face	(from	labour	unions	and	the	coalition	to	even	his	own	party),	Koizumi	brought	 forward	 large-scale	structural	reforms	 in	the	financial	sector	and	the	labour	market	(Hirashima,	2004,	p.	39).	While	his	programme	brought	 some	 relief	 in	 macroeconomic	 management,	 it	 also	 revealed	 significantly	increased	levels	of	economic	and	labour	inequality.		Economic	Policies	The	establishment	of	the	Council	of	Economic	and	Fiscal	Policy	in	2001	was	a	move	to	transfer	fiscal	and	economic	leadership	from	the	hands	of	bureaucrats	to	the	Cabinet;	in	doing	 so,	 Koizumi	 was	 able	 to	 bypass	 disputes	 and	 resistance	 forces	 from	 other	parliamentarians	–	at	least	to	some	level	(Hirashima,	2004,	p.	48).	The	CEFP	advanced	a	fiscal	guideline	agenda	concerning	various	areas	of	 the	economy	and	the	government.	Regarded	 as	 one	 of	 the	 most	 drastic	 post-war	 economic	 policies	 (Aoki	 et	 al.,	 2007),	Koizumi’s	strategy	emphasized	deregulation	and	institutional	transformation	under	the	slogan	‘structural	reform	without	sanctuaries’.	This	agenda	was	composed	of	three	parts:	the	 reform	of	 administrative	 system,	 the	 downsizing	 of	 the	 public	 sector,	 and	 further	deregulation	measures	in	other	societal	aspects,	such	as	labour	and	healthcare.			 In	 a	 clear	 neoliberal	manifestation,	 Koizumi	 proposed	 consolidation	 on	 public	finance	 by	 realizing	 the	 mandate	 to	 “leave	 the	 private	 sector	 to	 do	 what	 it	 can	 do.”	(Cabinet	Office,	2005,	p.	3)	As	a	result,	he	reduced	the	number	of	public	work	projects,	enhanced	 fiscal	 decentralization	 of	 local	 government	 authorities	 and	 opened	 up	government-led	markets	 (such	as	healthcare	and	education)	 to	private	 sectors.	These	advances	in	public	corporations’	transformation	were	intensified	with	the	privatizing	of	postal	services	in	2005,	a	major	reform	since	postal	savings	contributed	to	a	great	degree	to	 the	 control	 of	 financial	 movements	 (Lechevalier,	 2014,	 p.	 44).	 Even	 though	 the	launching	of	private-sector	management	techniques	was	expected	to	entail	 large-scale	unemployment,	the	government	moved	forward	to	the	privatization	or	abolishment	of		
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136	 corporations	 (Cabinet	 Office,	 2005).	 Consequently,	 unemployment	 reached	historical	rates	close	to	6%	at	that	time	(see	Figure	6).		Labour	Policies	To	 adjust	 the	 labour	market	 to	 the	 new	 conditions,	 the	 government	 initiated	 further	revisions	 to	 the	 Labor	 Standards	 Act	 (2003).	 The	 revised	 LSA	 mainly	 concerned	employees	with	fixed-term	contracts,	as	it	raised	the	upper	limit	of	employment	from	one	to	 three	 years	 in	 all	 types	 of	 industries	or	occupations	 (Song,	 2014).	The	 adoption	 of	Article	137	allowed	workers	to	resign	after	the	first	year	of	employment,	regardless	of	the	duration	of	 the	 contract	 (OECD,	2015).	 It	 also	 incorporated,	 for	 the	 first	 time,	 the	explicit	 clause	 requiring	 employers	 to	 have	 just	 cause	 for	 dismissals,	 thereby	guaranteeing	workers	to	be	employed	for	the	entire	duration	of	the	contract.	However,	employers	could	exploit	the	new	Act	by	constantly	hiring	new	staff	on	a	trial	basis	for	a	three-year	 term	and	 then	 rehiring	only	a	 small	percentage	of	workers	with	 indefinite	term	 contracts	 (Nakakubo,	 2004,	 p.	 7);	 companies	 could	 also	 break	 contracts	 by	redefining	 the	 positions	 (Watanabe,	 2012,	 p.	 42).	 Thus,	 the	 Cabinet	 strengthened	employment	protection	for	regular	workers	by	implementing	restrictions	on	lay-offs,	but,	simultaneously,	forwarded	increased	flexibility	for	non-regular	employees	(Song,	2014). 	 The	Worker	 Dispatching	 Law	 (2003)	 was	 also	 given	 another	 revision	 during	Koizumi’s	 tenure.	 Previously,	 the	 WDL	 allowed	 dispatching	 work	 in	 all	 occupational	categories	except	for	those	in	the	‘negative	list’	(construction,	several	social	services	and	manufacture,	 the	 largest	 sector).	 In	 an	 attempt	 to	 diversify	 the	 working	 patterns	 of	
Figure 6: Unemployment rates for people aged 15-65 (%). Source: Statistics Bureau of Japan (2017).	
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temporary	workers,	 the	 Cabinet	 further	 liberalized	 the	market	 and	 lifted	 the	 ban	 on	manufacture,	 extending	 the	 dispatch	 framework	 to	 cover	 all	 industries	 except	 for	transportation,	 construction	 and	 security	 services	 (Cabinet	 Office,	 2005,	 p.	 8).	 By	eliminating	legal	restrictions	in	 the	biggest	 industry,	Koizumi	aimed	to	make	Japanese	factories	competitive	on	the	global	markets	again	(Watanabe,	2012).	As	indicated	by	the	collocated	chart	(Figure	7),	the	abolishment	of	restrictions	by	the	amended	WDL	led	to	a	massive	 escalation	 of	 the	 number	 of	 temporary	 workers;	 the	 ratio	 of	 non-regular	employees	compared	to	regular	workers	increased	almost	7%	in	less	than	six	years,	and,	by	2006,	one	third	of	the	total	Japanese	labour	force	was	employed	under	non-regular	contracts.	The	 Koizumi	 administration	 viewed	 labour	 flexibility,	 market	 disciplining	 and	public	 reorganization	 as	 the	 core	 themes	 of	 its	 policy	 and	 presumed	 that	 economic	growth	 can	 be	 led	 by	 private-sector	 demand.	 Public	 corporations	 were	 rationalized,	resources	 were	 shifted	 towards	 industries	 that	 were	 deemed	 productive	 and	competitive,	and	labour	laws	were	further	deregulated	in	order	to	adjust	to	the	current	standards.	 Traditional	 employment	 procedures	 were	 further	 eroded,	 as	management	control	 on	 salary	 determination	 was	 enforced	 through	 the	 performance-based	 pay	system	(Shibata,	2016,	p.	499).	As	a	result,	wage	earnings	were	suppressed	(see	Figure	8),	 income	gaps	 between	 high	 and	 low-middle	 income	groups	widened,	 and	 Japanese	
Figure 7: Total number of regular and non-regular employees, plus total ratio of irregular workers compared to regular 
employees. Source: Ministry of Interior Affairs and Communication (2017), OECD (2018). 
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citizens	 started	 to	 experience	 increased	 levels	 of	 disparity	 and	 social	 segmentation	(Tsutomu,	2014).			
 
Figure 8: Total wage earnings growth (%). Source: Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (2017).			
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4. Shinzo	Abe	(September	2012	to	November	2017)	Shinzo	Abe	first	became	Prime	Minister	of	Japan	in	2006,	but	resigned	less	than	a	year	later	due	to	 low	popularity	rates	and	health	 issues.	His	re-election	 in	2012	followed	a	campaign	whereby	labour	and	fiscal	reform	were	considered	primary	tools	in	order	to	tackle	 sluggish	 economic	 growth,	 low	 consumer	 demand	 and	 increasing	 labour	shortages.	The	Cabinet	established	the	Council	for	Regulatory	Reform	(CRR)	that	would	form	policy	proposals	endorsing	economic	and	social	reforms	(OECD,	2015).	With	the	support	of	the	Council,	the	Abe	administration	introduced	a	three-arrow	reform	strategy	to	secure	the	realization	of	a	virtuous	economic	cycle.			Economic	policies	The	three-arrow	agenda	that	the	government	undertook	constitutes	of	a	policy	plan	that	“develops	simultaneously	the	three	prongs	of	bold	monetary	policy,	flexible	fiscal	policy,	and	a	growth	strategy	to	encourage	private	sector	investment.”	(Cabinet	Office,	2012).	The	plan,	commonly	known	as	‘Abenomics’,	includes	an	aggressive	quantitative	easing	by	the	Bank	of	Japan	(BoJ),	massive	fiscal	stimulus,	and	numerous	structural	adjustments	aimed	 to	 combat	 the	 depressed	 economic	 environment	 and	 to	 strengthen	 Japan’s	position	 in	 the	 global	 markets	 (Lechevalier,	 2014,	 p.	 51).	 It	 was	 thus	 regarded	 as	 a	revitalization	strategy	that	would	stimulate	the	Japanese	economy	in	the	medium	and	the	long	term.	Initially,	the	Cabinet	was	aiming	to	achieve	an	average	of	2%	GDP	growth	and	increase	household	 income	by	3%	over	the	next	decade;	early	observations	show	that	Abenomics	had	a	limited,	albeit	positive	impact	upon	growth	(Shibata,	2017,	p.	411),	and,	as	indicated	from	Figure	9,	total	wage	growth	appears	to	be	slightly	increased	after	a	long	period	of	experiencing	negative	rates.			 Three	years	after	 the	 introduction	of	Abenomics,	 the	government	announced	a	series	 of	 urgent	 policies	 to	 create	 a	 society	 “in	 which	 all	 citizens	 are	 dynamically	engaged,”	by	raising	minimum	wages	and	implementing	further	work-style	reforms	(ILO,	2018)	 Thus,	 Abe	 reshaped	 the	 three	 arrows	with	 three	 new	 ones	 to	 enhance	 labour	productivity	 through	 deregulation	 and	 further	 diversify	 the	 workforce	 (Watanabe,	2017):	achieve	and	maintain	a	robust	economy,	increase	child	care	support	to	encourage	women	 to	 participate	 in	 the	 labour	 force,	 and	 restructure	 social	 security	 services	 to	reduce	incidents	of	workers	leaving	their	jobs	to	take	care	of	family	members	(Takashi,	2016).	
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Figure 9: Total wage earnings growth (%). Source: Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (2017).	Labour	Policies	The	 third	 Abenomics	 arrow	 included	 policies	 to	 enhance	 productivity	 while	 it	simultaneously	administered	measures	to	promote	a	better	work-life	balance	amongst	both	regular	and	non-regular	employees.	In	order	to	do	so,	the	Cabinet	provoked	another	amendment	 to	 the	 Labour	 Standards	 Act	 (2013).	 Abe	 shifted	 further	 away	 from	 the	traditional	seniority-based	system	as	he	established	the	‘equal	work,	equal	pay’	principle,	allowing	workers	to	be	paid	based	on	their	performance	instead	of	the	amount	of	time	spent	 in	 the	 workforce.	 This	 practice	 was	 also	 enacted	 in	 order	 to	 address	 wage	disparities	 between	 regular	 and	 non-regular	 employees	 (Lechevalier,	 2014,	 p.	 51);	according	to	the	OECD	(2018),	irregular	Japanese	workers	earn	roughly	60%	less	salaries	than	their	regular	counterparts.	Increased	wages	for	those	workers	would	not	only	boost	their	 morale,	 but	 would	 also	 raise	 their	 purchasing	 power	 and	 increase	 consumer	demand	 as	 well	 as	 remove	 disincentives	 for	 them	 to	 participate	 in	 the	 labour	 force	(Takashi,	2016,	p.	5).		One	of	 the	most	controversial	revisions	was	the	expansion	of	 the	discretionary	labour	system	into	other	emerging	industry	sectors.	This	system	enables	employers	to	pay	workers	a	fixed	income	according	to	a	predetermined	number	of	hours	rather	than	actual	working	hours	(ILO,	2018).	Therefore,	employees	would	not	be	entitled	to	be	paid	for	overtime	work	that	has	not	been	agreed	upon	in	advance.	The	introduction	of	a	new	“highly	 professional	 expertise”	 system	 also	 lifts	 overtime	 regulations	 on	 workers	occupied	in	positions	that	require	specialized	skills	–	a	practice	which,	in	combination	
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with	 the	 discretionary	work	 scheme	 could	 result	 in	 employees	working	 longer	 hours	without	being	paid	overtime	(Kojima	et	al.,	2017).		The	 aforementioned	measures	might	 have	 been	 undertaken	 in	 order	 to	 tackle	disparities	 between	 regular	 and	 non-regular	 workers,	 but	 the	 number	 of	 atypical	employees	did	not	 cease	 to	 increase	 (see	Figure	10).	The	new	revision	of	 the	Worker	
Dispatching	Law	would	 further	 increase	the	share	of	 temporary	workers	in	 the	 labour	market,	which	emphasized	liberalization	of	agency	work	and	deregulation	of	work	hours.	The	previous	WDL	calculated	terms	on	position	basis;	that	is,	if	a	dispatch	employee	had	been	working	in	the	position	for	two	years	and	was	replaced	by	another	worker	for	the	third	 year,	 the	 three-year	 term	 would	 be	 regarded	 as	 complete.	 The	 current	 WDL	explicitly	states	a	term	limit	of	three	years	per	person,	therefore	calculation	starts	over	if	a	new	dispatch	worker	replaces	a	previous	one	(ILO,	2018).	This	measure	 introduced	additional	flexibility	to	employers	since	it	eliminated	almost	all	limits	on	using	temporary	workers;	companies	are	now	able	to	use	dispatch	work	with	no	time	limit	so	long	as	they	replace	temporary	staff	every	three	years	for	the	same	position	(Watanabe,	2017).	The	government	 also	 proposed	 the	 use	 of	 the	 term	 ‘semi-regular’	 (or	 ‘limited’)	 as	 an	alternative	to	non-regular	work,	as	a	way	to	ensure	that	non-regular	employees	enjoy	the	same	employment	conditions	with	regular	workers	(North,	2014).	At	 the	 time	 of	 writing	 this	 paper,	 the	 results	 of	 Abenomics	 are	 rather	 mixed.	Unemployment	 rates	 have	 been	 gradually	 dropping	 (see	 Figure	 11),	 yet	 non-regular	workers	 still	 amount	 to	 almost	 40%	 of	 the	 total	 workforce.	 Wage	 earnings	 were	increased,	 but	 income	 inequality	 persists,	 despite	 the	 fact	 that	 reducing	 the	 pay	 gap	
Figure 10: Total number of regular and non-regular employees, plus total ratio of irregular workers compared to regular 
employees. Source: Ministry of Interior Affairs and Communication (2017), OECD (2018). 
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between	regular	and	non-regular	workers	was	a	top	priority	for	Abe	(Kojima	et	al.,	2017,	p.	5).	GDP	rates	have	slightly	risen	(OECD,	2018),	mainly	due	to	the	monetary	and	fiscal	stimuli	that	Abe’s	economic	plan	ensued.	However,	the	deregulation	of	the	labour	market	suggests	that	Abe	continued	the	neoliberal	agenda	of	his	predecessors	in	the	employment	sector	 (Lechevalier,	 2014;	Shibata,	 2017).	 It	 appears	 that	Abe	 has	 shifted	 support	 for	employment	 stability	 to	 support	 for	 employment	 mobility	 (North,	 2014),	 and	 the	feasibility	and	likely	success	of	his	efforts	rely	upon	the	government’s	desire	to	reform	the	current	labour	practices	in	order	to	reduce	disparities	in	a	way	that	will	not	conflict	with	the	efforts	of	Japanese	firms	to	cut	expenses	(Takashi,	2016,	p.	6).		
 
Figure 11: Unemployment rates for people aged 15-65 (%). Source: Statistics Bureau of Japan (2017).	
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Chapter	4:	Discussion	Taking	 the	 above	 analysis	 into	 consideration,	 this	 chapter	 discusses	 the	 findings	 and	provides	a	plausible	answer	to	the	research	question	by	identifying	the	pathway	in	which	the	 independent	 variable	 (neoliberal	 state	 policies)	 causes	 and	 affects	 the	 dependent	variable	(labour	 inequality).	 	A	brief	summarization	of	 the	results	can	be	 found	 in	the	table	below.	
	 Economic	Policy	 Labour	Market	Policy	 Labour	Inequality	Levels	
Yasuhiro	Nakasone	 Liberalization	of	trade	and	financial	market;	enhanced	participation	for	private	entities	
à	Neoliberal	
Legalization	of	worker	dispatching	scheme,	making	the	labour	market	more	flexible	
à	Neoliberal	
Unemployment	rates	increased;	WDL	introduces	stratification	of	workers	
à	increased	
Ryutaro	Hashimoto	 Fiscal	consolidation	and	lessening	of	regulations	in	financial	market	
à	Neoliberal	
Deregulation	in	the	labour	market;	increased	number	of	occupations	available	for	dispatch	work	
à	Neoliberal	
Unemployment	rates	increased;	wage	earnings	decreased;	non-regular	workers	increased	
à	increased	
Junichiro	Koizumi	 Downsizing	of	public	sector;	privatization	of	state-led	corporations	
à	Neoliberal	
Expansion	of	WDL	to	manufacturing	industries;	increased	flexibility	for	non-regular	workers	
à	Neoliberal	
Unemployment	rates	reached	record	high	levels;	wage	earnings	decreased;	non-regular	workers	increased	
à	increased	
Shinzo	Abe	
Monetary	easing	and	fiscal	stimulus	
à	Keynesian	
Liberalization	of	agency	work	and	expansion	of	the	discretionary	work	scheme	
à	Neoliberal	
Unemployment	rates	fell;	wage	earnings	slightly	increased;	non-regular	workers	increased	
à	remain	stable	albeit	in	high	levels		
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Explanation	of	results	The	 hypothesis	 of	 this	 paper	 assumes	 that	 the	 policies	 undertaken	 by	 the	 Japanese	administration	 in	 the	 last	 two	 decades	 have	 contributed	 to	 a	 great	 degree	 in	 the	development	of	disparities	in	the	labour	market.	To	confirm	this	theory,	we	firstly	need	to	assess	the	levels	of	neoliberal	ideology	in	government	policymaking.	It	appears	that	economic	 governance	 has	 not	 always	 been	 consistent;	 while	 Ryutaro	 Hashimoto	 and	Junichiro	Koizumi	continued	the	neoliberal	political	trend	that	Yasuhiro	Nakasone	first	implemented	in	Japanese	economic	affairs,	Shinzo	Abe	has	so	far	been	handling	monetary	and	fiscal	policy	using	remedies	from	the	Keynesian	textbook	(Lechevalier,	2014;	Shibata,	2017).	 	However,	all	governments	have	been	continuously	lessening	regulations	in	the	labour	market,	leading	to	the	gradual	erosion	of	traditional	Japanese	labour	institutions	such	as	the	seniority-based	wage	system	and	lifetime	employment.	Hence,	while	there	is	no	drastic	neoliberal	change	observed	in	terms	of	the	economic	model	per	se,	there	is	a	gradual	neoliberal	attempt	in	the	labour	market	as	a	result	of	the	multiple	deregulation	policies	interacting	over	time.		 What	 the	 Japanese	 labour	market	 is	 experiencing	 can	 be	 characterized	 as	 the	stratification	of	its	workforce;	depending	on	their	employment	contracts,	employees	are	divided	 into	 insiders	 (regular)	 and	 outsiders	 (non-regular)	 or,	 into	 the	 core	 and	 the	periphery	 (North,	 2014).	 Workers	 in	 the	 core	 sector	 have	 managed	 to	 maintain	 a	satisfying	level	of	employment	protection	and	job	security	through	the	years,	whereas	workers	in	the	peripheral	sector	are	subject	to	relatively	lower	earnings	and	increasing	employment	instability.	State	laws	and	policies	play	a	crucial	role	on	this	divergence,	as	the	 acceleration	 in	 the	 process	 of	 economic	 revitalization	has	 challenged	 institutional	foundations	and	encouraged	the	adoption	of	flexible	employment	measures	that	enhance	polarization	 in	the	 labour	market.	Based	on	the	strategy	that	 the	past	and	the	current	Japanese	policymakers	are	following,	it	could	be	said	that	peripheral	workers	suffered	the	cost	of	labour	market	reforms,	whilst	changes	in	the	employment	conditions	for	the	core	 workers	 were	 relatively	 minimal	 (Song,	 2014).	 Therefore,	 labour	 market	liberalization	undermined	the	status	of	non-regular	workers	since	their	differences	from	their	regular	counterparts	were	further	enlarged.	The	results	of	the	analysis	are	not	optimistic;	it	appears	that	the	transformation	of	the	 labour	market	has	worsened	conditions	 for	 the	 Japanese	employees.	Deregulation	policies	 led	 to	heightened	discrimination	between	workers	 regarding	quality	of	work,	
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access	to	regular	employment	and	professional	development.	The	number	of	working-poor	 amongst	 non-regular	 workers	 has	 risen	 (Watanabe,	 2012),	 while	 the	 pay	 gaps	between	 core	 and	 peripheral	 employees	 are	 yet	 to	 be	 bridged.	 As	 the	 character	 of	regulations	shifted	from	being	protective	to	being	directive	and	flexible,	workers	found	themselves	in	a	labour	environment	with	minimal	security.	Although	the	negative	effects	are	greater	among	non-regular	employees,	regular	workers	also	face	work	pressure	since	peripheral	workers	can	perform	the	same	tasks	and	duties	for	less	pay	and	fewer	benefits	(North,	2014,	p.	7).	The	greater	use	of	non-regular	employment	by	Japanese	companies	indicates	than	the	production	of	capital	is	prioritized	over	the	interests	of	labour.	Capital-labour	relations,	therefore,	have	been	altered	at	the	cost	of	workers,	be	it	in	regular	or	non-regular	employment.	At	the	time	of	writing,	the	Abe	government	has	so	far	attempted	to	address	the	right	issues,	albeit	by	pushing	the	wrong	remedies.	The	‘equal	work,	equal	pay’	principle	suggests	that	workers	must	be	paid	according	their	contribution	in	the	workplace.	This	implies	that	if	a	worker	is	not	satisfied	with	their	treatment	they	should	acquire	more	skills	and	be	more	productive	(Kojima	et	al.,	2017,	p.	7).	Therefore,	this	policy	might	be	problematic	rather	than	beneficial	for	the	workers,	as	it	legitimizes	their	status	and	class	position	based	on	their	employer’s	judgement	and	cultivates	“the	neoliberal	culture	of	self-blame	and	individualistic	ethic	of	hard	work.”	(ibid,	p.	13).	Furthermore,	the	fact	that	the	Cabinet	used	 falsified	data	 to	 justify	 its	 forthcoming	discretionary	 labour	 strategy	(Okunuki,	 2018),	 makes	 the	 public	 less	 confident	 in	 the	 government's	 initiatives	 to	alleviate	the	current	labour	conditions	any	time	soon.	The	struggle	to	balance	economic	transformation	with	social	fairness	is	putting	a	lot	 of	 pressure	 to	 Japanese	 policymakers.	 Company	 managers	 rush	 for	 enhanced	deregulation,	 whereas	 conservative	 officials	 who	 stick	 to	 the	 traditional	 coordinated	patterns	oppose	these	adjustments	(Watanabe,	2015).	The	cost	of	reforms	ultimately	falls	to	 the	 workers,	 who	 aim	 for	 a	 more	 reliable	 labour	 environment	 than	 atypical	employment,	but	receive	mobility	and	decreasing	legal	protection	instead.	In	the	name	of	economic	 growth	 and	 international	 competitiveness,	 Japanese	workers	 –	 particularly	those	hired	with	non-regular	contracts	 -	have	to	 face	 increasing	 job	uncertainty,	wage	disparities	and	precariousness.		
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New	Social	Contract	The	 previous	 section	 indicates	 that	 Japanese	 citizens	 are	 experiencing	 a	 new	 social	compromise,	whereby	duality	and	precarious	work	has	become	the	norm.	For	decades	after	the	Second	World	War,	Japan’s	social	contract	pertained	low	unemployment	rates,	growing	prosperity,	and	a	relatively	stable	and	secure	society.	The	weakening	of	labour	market	institutions	during	the	last	two	decades,	however,	implies	that	work	is	no	longer	associated	with	a	guarantee	of	social	integration	(Shibata,	2017).	Japan	is	witnessing	a	transition	from	an	egalitarian	society	to	an	unequal	one,	partially	due	to	increased	use	of	flexible	 employment,	 declining	 wage	 earnings	 and	 an	 overall	 heightened	 sense	 of	insecurity.		 The	segmentation	of	the	labour	market	has	a	variety	of	results	in	social	structure.	The	standards	of	living	in	postwar	Japan	used	to	be	at	quite	a	high	level,	as	most	parts	of	society	considered	themselves	to	belong	in	the	middle	class	(Shirahase,	2014).	However,	the	new	institutional	arrangements	in	employment	has	fractured	the	middle-	and	low-income	classes	(Song,	2010;	Kojima	et	al.,	2017).	Despite	the	fact	that	precarity	is	now	one	of	the	most	dominant	components	in	the	workplace	(Kalleberg,	2009),	it	is	not	given	the	attention	 it	needs	by	governments,	 as	 shown	by	 several	 significant	 consequences,	such	as	the	increasing	numbers	of	the	elderly	with	a	wide	income	gap,	and	the	persistent	discriminations	against	women	in	employment.		 Traditionally,	 the	 Japanese	 state	 did	 not	 provide	 an	 adequate	 safety	 net	 to	 its	citizens,	 as	 employment	 security	 for	men	was	 a	 fait	 accompli	 (Cargill	 and	 Sakamoto,	2008).	Non-working	women	would	 essentially	 take	 the	 role	of	 the	 caregiver	 for	 their	offspring	 as	 well	 as	 for	 the	 elderly	 relatives.	 Nowadays,	 family	 structures	 have	substantially	 been	 altered;	 the	 heightened	 economic	 insecurity	 and	 the	 increasing	household	needs	have	brought	more	women	in	the	labour	force	and,	at	the	same	time,	have	 ostracized	 the	 elderly,	 who	 now	 rely	 on	 public	 assistance	 for	 their	 care.	 The	privatization	of	social	services	–	a	policy	accelerated	under	the	Koizumi	administration	-	has	contributed	to	the	deterioration	of	the	economic	position	of	the	elderly	population	in	Japan.		 The	status	of	women	in	employment	 is	still	a	matter	of	concern.	Female	 labour	force	 participation	might	 have	 been	 increased	 in	 the	 recent	 years	 (OECD,	 2018),	 but	working	women	still	face	certain	struggles.	Having	to	endure	the	third	highest	gender	pay	gap	amongst	all	OECD	states,	women	find	themselves	 in	 flexible	 forms	of	employment	
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(temporary,	part-time)	or	in	occupations	with	low	responsibilities	that	tend	to	reproduce	the	 stereotyping	 role	 of	woman	 rather	 than	 overthrow	 it	 (Chiavacci	 and	Hommerich,	2017).	In	addition,	the	number	of	women	hired	in	managerial	positions	is	rather	limited	(OECD,	2018),	 indicating	that	 female	workers	have	 fewer	employment	prospects	 than	their	male	counterparts.	The	fact	that	childcare	facilities	are	inadequate	and	expensive	further	discourages	women	from	pursuing	a	professional	career.	Female	participation	in	the	workforce	might	have	thus	increased	in	quantity,	but	not	in	quality,	as	employment	is	still	regarded	as	a	primarily	male-centered	activity.		 The	social	changes	that	have	been	taking	place	along	with	policy	adjustments	led	to	the	appearance	of	new	social	groups.	Typically,	a	rapidly	ageing	labour	force	would	suggest	a	higher	demand	for	young	workers	and	graduates	(Inagami,	2004).	In	reality,	however,	young	adults	are	poorly	integrated	in	employment	as	usually	the	only	available	occupations	 for	 them	 are	 in	 the	 non-regular	 sector.	 The	 term	 ‘freeter’	was	 coined	 for	those	 young	 people	 who	 earn	 their	 living	 by	 temporary	 or	 part-time	 work,	 whilst	‘parasaito	 shinguru’	 (parasite	 singles)	 refers	 to	 unmarried	 adults	 beyond	 their	 late	twenties	who	live	with	their	families	and	have	their	basic	expenses	taken	care	of	by	their	parents	 (Hamada	 and	 Kato,	 2007).	 The	 number	 of	 individuals	 not	 in	 education,	employment	or	training	(‘NEETs’)	has	risen,	whilst	some	parts	of	the	population	choose	to	completely	remove	themselves	from	social	situations,	giving	rise	to	the	phenomenon	of	 hikikomori	 (Bass	 et	 al.,	 2010).	 It	 is	 thus	 evident	 that	 inequality	 has	 far-reaching	implications	for	societal	structure,	while	the	policies	undertaken	by	the	recent	Japanese	governments	have	succeeded	in	institutionalizing	the	new	social	contract	whereby	social	integration,	 job	 security	 and	 quality	 of	 life	 in	 general	 are	 getting	 progressively	obliterated.		
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Conclusion	The	initially	stated	purpose	of	this	study	was	to	identify	the	causal	mechanisms	that	link	neoliberalization	with	the	rigidities	detected	in	the	Japanese	labour	market.	The	results	corroborate	the	hypothesis,	according	to	which	the	neoliberal	policies	administered	by	Prime	Ministers	Yasuhiro	Nakasone,	Ryutaro	Hashimoto,	Junichiro	Koizumi	and	Shinzo	Abe	 contributed	 to	 a	 great	 degree	 to	 the	 rising	 of	 labour	 inequality	 as	 well	 as	 the	deterioration	of	the	conditions	in	the	labour	market	in	general.	The	theoretical	and	empirical	analysis	showcase	that,	whilst	the	transformation	of	 the	 Japanese	 economic	 model	 has	 not	 been	 linear,	 there	 is	 a	 gradual	 neoliberal	progress	in	the	labour	sector	reflected	by	the	continuous	deregulation	schemes	that	the	administrations	have	chosen	to	pursue.	The	structure	of	labour	market	institutions	has	been	 altered,	 as	 forms	 of	 contingent	 employment	 expanded	 in	 the	 last	 twenty	 years.	Japanese	 companies	 are	 following	 a	 neoliberal	 creed	 by	 seeking	 to	 dismantle	 costly	traditions	that	guarantee	employment	security,	while	the	government	is	endorsing	these	attempts	viewing	them	as	a	method	to	make	the	Japanese	market	competitive	again.	The	impacts	of	Japan’s	labour	reforms	call	for	extended	state	supervision	in	order	to	protect	the	citizens	from	the	risks	the	market	generates.	The	deterioration	of	regulatory	labour	measures	implies	that	working	conditions	and	employment	protection	would	be	further	downgraded,	leading	to	increased	levels	of	job	insecurity	for	the	Japanese	workers.	The	Japanese	policymakers	need	to	seek	out	 the	right	balance	 in	order	to	make	the	 labour	market	more	flexible	without	removing	protections	for	the	part	of	the	labour	force	that	has	 borne	 the	 costs	 of	 liberalization	 –	 that	 is,	workers	with	 non-regular	 employment	contracts.		The	results	of	 this	research	do	not	 invalidate	other	alternative	explanations	 for	the	 production	 of	 greater	 economic	 and	 labour	 inequality;	 economic	 crises,	 ageing	population	 and	 perseverance	 to	 institutions	 that	 do	 not	 actively	 respond	 to	 changing	external	 environments	 are	 still	 all	 plausible	 arguments.	 What	 this	 paper	 sought	 out,	however,	 is	 to	 determine	 whether	 the	 neoliberal	 ideology	 that	 penetrates	 the	 policy	agendas	of	the	Japanese	policymakers	is	encouraging	the	appearance	of	disparities	in	the	labour	force.	The	analysis	clearly	indicates	that	the	acceleration	of	labour	inequality	in	Japan	 can	 be	 also	 credited	 to	 the	 neoliberal	 nature	 of	 the	 labour	 policies	 that	 the	
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government	has	adopted	after	 the	1980’s,	making	neoliberal	politics	 at	 least	partially	attributable	to	this	phenomenon.	While	 the	 study	 of	 Japan’s	 liberalization	 transformation	 has	 been	 discussed	extensively	in	comparative	academic	literature,	this	paper	contributes	to	knowledge	of	the	 changing	 labour	 patterns	 affiliated	with	 this	 neoliberal	 process	 and	 the	 role	 they	played	 in	 forming	 issues	 of	 inequality	 and	 discrimination	 in	 the	 labour	 market.	 The	introduction	 of	 neoliberal	 institutional	 reforms	might	 have	 challenged	 the	 traditional	Japanese	labour	institutions,	but	there	is	a	wide	range	of	distributive	policies	that	could	be	taken	in	order	to	ameliorate	labour	conditions	and	guarantee	social	integration	and	fairness	in	the	community.	The	question	that	is	yet	to	be	answered,	however,	is	whether	Japanese	policymakers	are	willing	to	commit	to	this	cause	and	take	the	political	risk	of	building	a	just	society	for	all.		
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Appendix	
Year	 Regular	Workers		(in	thousands)	 Total	Irregular	Workers	(in	thousands)	 Total	ratio	of	irregular	workers		
1996	 39884	 11446	 22,3%	1997	 38542	 12605	 24,6%	1998	 38865	 12955	 25%	1999	 38153	 13127	 25,6%	2001	 37252	 13638	 26,8%	2002	 36867	 13843	 27,3%	2003	 35454	 15266	 30,1%	2004	 34807	 15932	 31,4%	2005	 34384	 16706	 32,7%	2006	 34820	 17150	 33%	2007	 35019	 17641	 33,5%	2008	 34837	 17863	 33,9%	2012	 33956	 18444	 35,2%	2013	 33499	 19421	 36,7%	2014	 33466	 19994	 37,4%	2015	 33619	 20171	 37,5%	2016	 34107	 20463	 37,5%	2017	 34147	 20313	 37,3%	
	
Table	showing	total	number	of	regular	and	irregular	employees,	and	total	ratio	of	irregular	
workers	compared	to	regular	employees.	Source:	MIAC	(2017),	OECD	(2018).	
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Prime	Minister	 Year	 Wage	Growth	
Yasuhiro		Nakasone	
1982	 4,8	1983	 1,7	1984	 3,6	1985	 2,3	1986	 3,9	1987	 2	1988	 0,1	1989	 5,7	
Ryutaro		Hashimoto	
1996	 0,1	1997	 6,3	1998	 -0,8	1999	 -3,2	2000	 -2,4	
Junichiro		Koizumi	
2001	 0,4	2002	 -4,3	2003	 -2,9	2004	 -1,9	2005	 -0,5	2006	 -0,1	2007	 -1	2008	 -2,2	
Shinzo		Abe	
2012	 -1,4	2013	 -2,1	2014	 -0,7	2015	 0,3	2016	 0,1	2017	 0,6		
Table	showing total	wage	earnings	growth	(%).	Source:	Ministry	of	Health,	Labour	and	Welfare	
(2017).	
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Prime	Minister	 Year	 Unemployment	Rates	Q1	 Q2	 Q3	 Q4	
Yasuhiro	Nakasone	
1982	 2,26	 2,4	 2,4	 2,5	1983	 2,7	 2,7	 2,73	 2,7	1984	 2,8	 2,76	 2,76	 2,7	1985	 2,63	 2,6	 2,63	 2,86	1986	 2,73	 2,83	 2,63	 2,86	1987	 2,96	 3,1	 2,8	 2,76	1988	 2,76	 2,56	 2,56	 2,46	1989	 2,4	 2,36	 2,3	 2,26	
Ryutaro	Hashimoto	
1996	 3,5	 3,53	 3,43	 3,46	1997	 3,46	 3,5	 3,53	 3,66	1998	 3,83	 4,23	 4,4	 4,6	1999	 4,8	 4,93	 4,9	 4,96	2000	 5	 4,9	 4,86	 4,96	
Junichiro		Koizumi	
2001	 4,93	 5,06	 5,36	 5,6	2002	 5,56	 5,63	 5,7	 5,56	2003	 5,63	 5,66	 5,36	 5,23	2004	 5,1	 4,93	 4,96	 4,73	2005	 4,73	 4,63	 4,5	 4,66	2006	 4,4	 4,33	 4,3	 4,23	2007	 4,2	 3,9	 4,03	 4,1	2008	 4,1	 4,1	 4,16	 4,26	
Shinzo	Abe	
2012	 4,73	 4,63	 4,5	 4,36	2013	 4,4	 4,3	 4,43	 4,06	2014	 3,8	 3,8	 3,73	 3,63	2015	 3,63	 3,5	 3,5	 3,46	2016	 3,4	 3,33	 3,2	 3,16	2017	 3,03	 3,03	 2,96	 2,83		
Table	showing unemployment	rates	for	people	aged	15-65	(%).	Source:		Statistics	Bureau	of	Japan	
(2017).		
